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Abstract—In this paper, we present and analyze the properties
of a new class of games - the spatial congestion game (SCG),
which is a generalization of the classical congestion game (CG).
In a classical congestion game, multiple users share the same
set of resources and a user’s payoff for using any resource is a
function of the total number of users sharing it. As a potential
game, this game enjoys some very appealing properties, including
the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (NE) and
that every improvement path is finite and leads to such a NE
(also called the finite improvement property or FIP). While it’s
tempting to use this model to study spectrum sharing, it does
not capture the spatial reuse feature of wireless communication,
where resources (interpreted as channels) may be reused without
increasing congestion provided that users are located far away
from each other. This motivates us to study an extended form of
the congestion game where a user’s payoff for using a resource
is a function of the number of its interfering users sharing
it. This naturally results in a spatial congestion game (SCG),
where users are placed over a network (or a conflict graph). We
study fundamental properties of a spatial congestion game; in
particular, we seek to answer under what conditions this game
possesses the finite improvement property or a Nash equilibrium.
We also discuss the implications of these results when applied to
wireless spectrum sharing.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we study a spatial congestion game (SCG),
which is a generalized form of the class of non-coopertive
strategic games known as congestion games (CG) [1], [2]. We
analyze the properties of the SCG and discuss its application
to spectrum sharing in multi-channel wireless networks.
In a classical congestion game, multiple users share multiple
resources. A user’s payoff 1 for using a particular resource
depends on the number of users simultaneously using that
resource. A formal description is provided in Section II. The
congestion game framework is well suited to model resource
competition where the resulting payoff is a function of the
level of congestion (number of active users). It has been
extensively studied within the context of wireline network
routing, see for instance the congestion game studied in [3],
where each source node seeks the minimum delay path to
a destination node, and the delay of a link depends on the
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1One can also consider the cost of using a resource instead of payoff. If
we define the cost as the inverse of the payoff, then maximizing the payoff
is equivalent to minimizing the cost. For simplicity of presentation, we will
only refer to the maximization of payoff in this paper.
number of flows going through that link. It has recently
been used in wireless network modeling, e.g., access point
selection in WiFi networks [14], [15], resource competition
in multicamera wireless surveillance networks [17], uplink
resource allocation in multichannel wireless access networks
[12], wireless channels with multipacket reception capability
[16], and the impact of interference set in studying the
congestion game in wireless mesh networks [13].
A congestion game enjoys many nice properties: it has a
pure strategy Nash Equilibrium (NE), and any asynchronous
improvement path is finite and will lead to a pure strategy
NE. The latter property is also called the finite improvement
property (FIP): local greedy updates of selfish users collec-
tively optimize a global objective known as the potential
function, and such updates converge in a finite number of steps
regardless of the updating sequence.
Due to the above reasons, it is tempting to model resource
competition in a wireless communication system as a con-
gestion game. However, the standard congestion game fails
to capture a critical aspect of resource sharing in wireless
communication: interference. A key assumption underlying the
congestion game model is that all users have an equal impact
on the congestion, and therefore all that matters is the total
number of users of a resource. This however is not true in
wireless communication. Specifically, if we consider channels
as resources, then sharing the same channel is complicated by
interference; a user’s payoff (e.g., channel quality, achievable
rates, etc.) depends on who the other users are and how much
interference it receives from them. If all other simultaneous
users are sufficiently far away, then sharing may not cause
any performance degradation, a feature commonly known as
spatial reuse.
The above consideration poses significant challenge in using
the congestion game model depending on what type of user
objectives we are interested in. In our recent work [4], we
addressed the user-specific interference issue within the tradi-
tional congestion game framework, by introducing a concept
called resource expansion, where we define virtual resources
as certain spectral-spatial unit that allows us to capture pair-
wise interference. This approach was shown to be quite
effective for user objectives like interference minimization.
In this paper, we take a different and more general approach,
where we generalize the standard congestion games to directly
account for the interference relationship and spatial reuse in
wireless networks. This class of generalized games will be re-
ferred to as spatial congestion games (SCG). A key ingredient
in this generalization is an interference graph describing the
congestion relationship among users. In using a resource (a
wireless channel), a user’s payoff is a function of the total
number of users who are using the same resource and are
within its interference set (i.e., connected to it by edges).
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2Therefore, resources are reusable beyond a user’s interference
set. The original congestion game is now a special case of
the extended SCG when the underlying interference graph is
complete (i.e., every user interferes with every other user) 2.
Congestion games played on networks have been studied
before in [7], where each user has the same linear payoff
function. Our SCG model allows user-specific payoff functions
of more general forms. In this sense our model is also a gen-
eralization of that considered in [7]. This allows us to model
systems like cognitive radio networks where technologies may
vary from user to user.
The applicability of the SCG to a multi-channel, multi-
user wireless communication system can be easily understood.
Specifically, we consider a system where a user can only
access one channel at a time, but can switch between chan-
nels. A user’s principal interest lies in optimizing its own
performance (e.g., its data rate) by selecting the best channel
for itself. This and similar problems have recently captured
increasing interest from the research community, particularly
in the context of cognitive radio networks (CRN) and software
defined ratio (SDR) technologies, where devices expected to
have far greater flexibility in sensing channel availability and
moving their operating frequencies. More broadly, the SCG
framework is potentially applicable to many other scenarios
where resources are shared over space.
In subsequent sections we will examine what properties
a SCG has. Our main findings are summarized as follows
for undirected network graphs and non-increasing payoff
functions (in the number of users sharing a resource):
1) The FIP property is preserved in an SCG with only two
resources/channels. Counter examples exist for three or
more resources.
2) The FIP property is preserved in an SCG when all
resources are identical to a user (but may be different to
different users). In the context of multi-channel commu-
nications, this means each channel is of equal bandwidth
and quality for a user.
3) A pure strategy NE exists in an SCG over a tree network,
a loop, a regular bipartite network, and when there is a
dominating resource.
4) We identify counter examples to show that an NE does
not necessarily exist when the network graph is directed
(meaning that the interference relationship between users
is asymmetric), or when users’ payoff functions are non-
monotonic.
It should be mentioned that game theoretic approaches have
often been used to devise effective decentralized solutions to
a multi-agent system. Within the context of wireless commu-
nication networks and interference modeling, different classes
of games have been studied. An example is the well-known
Gaussian interference game [8], [9], in which a player can
2In our preliminary work [6] we used the term network congestion games.
However, to better differentiate this class of games from routing games (see
e.g., [27], [28]) which are also sometimes referred to as network congestion
games, we will use the term spatial congestion games in this paper. Note that
a routing game is essentially a classical congestion game in which a user’s
strategy space consists of a set of feasible routes and each route consists of
multiple resources (links).
spread a fixed amount of power arbitrarily across a continuous
bandwidth, and tries to maximize its total rate in a Gaussian
interference channel over all possible power allocation strate-
gies. The Bayesian form of the Gaussian interference game
was studied in [11] in the case of incomplete information.
In addition, a market based power control mechanism was
investigated via supermodularity in [10], and using externality
in [29]. A spectrum sharing similar to the one studied here
was investigated in [30] using a mechanism design approach
in seeking a globally optimal solution. In our problem the total
power of a user is not divisible, and it can only use it in one
channel at a time. This setup is more appropriate for scenarios
where the channels have been pre-defined, and the users do
not have the ability to access multiple channels simultaneously
(which is the case with many existing devices).
The organization of the remainder of this paper is as follows.
In Section II we present a brief review on the background
of the classical CG, and formally define the class of SCG
in Section III. We then derive conditions under which SCG
possesses the finite improvement property in Section IV. We
further show a series of conditions, on the underlying network
graph and on the user payoff function in Section V, under
which an SCG has a pure strategy NE. We discuss extensions
to our work in Section VI and conclude the paper in VII.
II. A REVIEW OF CONGESTION GAMES
In this section we provide a brief review on the definition
of congestion games and their known properties3. We then
discuss why the classical congestion game does not capture
spatial reuse and motivate our generalized spatial congestion
games.
A. Congestion Games
Congestion games [1], [2] are a class of strategic games
given by the tuple (I,R, (Σi)i∈I , (gr)r∈R), where I =
{1, 2, · · · , N} denotes a set of users, R = {1, 2, · · · , R} a
set of resources, Σi ⊂ 2R the strategy space of player i,
and gr : N → Z a payoff (or cost) function associated with
resource r. The payoff (cost) gr(·) of resource r is a function
of the total number of users using that resource, and in general
is assumed to be non-increasing (non-decreasing). A player in
this game aims to maximize (minimize) its total payoff (cost)
which is the sum total of payoff (cost) over all resources its
strategy involves. For the rest of the paper, we will only refer
to payoff maximization.
Denoting by σ = (σ1, σ2, · · · , σN ) the strategy profile,
where σi ∈ Σi, user i’s total payoff is given by
qi(σ) =
∑
r∈σi
gr(nr(σ)) , (1)
where nr(σ) is the total number of users using resource r
under the strategy profile σ, and r ∈ σi denoting that user i
selects resource r under σ.
3This review along with some of our notations are primarily based on
references [1], [2], [18].
3We can define Rosenthal’s potential function φ : Σ1×Σ2×
· · · × ΣN → Z as
φ(σ) =
∑
r∈R
nr(σ)∑
i=1
gr(i) =
N∑
i=1
∑
r∈σi
gr(m
i
r(σ)) , (2)
where the second equality comes from exchanging the two
sums, and mir(σ) denotes the number of players who use
resource r under strategy σ and whose corresponding indices
do not exceed i (i.e., in the set {1, 2, · · · , i}).
Next we show that the change in user i’s payoff as a result
of its unilateral move (i.e., all other users’ strategy σ−i remain
fixed) is exactly the same as the change in the potential func-
tion. This implies that the potential function may be viewed as
a global objective function. Consider player i, who unilaterally
moves from strategy σi (within the profile σ = (σi, σ−i)) to
strategy σ′i (within the profile σ
′ = (σ′i, σ−i)). The change of
potential function is
φ(σ′i, σ−i)− φ(σi, σ−i)
=
∑
r∈σ′i ,r 6∈σi
gr(nr(σ) + 1)−
∑
r∈σi,r 6∈σ′i
gr(nr(σ))
=
∑
r∈σ′i
gr(nr(σ
′
))−
∑
r∈σi
gr(nr(σ))
= gi(σ−i, σ
′
i)− gi(σ−i, σi) .
The second equality comes from the fact that the number of
total users does not change for any resource that is used by
both strategies σi and σ
′
i. To see why the first equality is true,
set i = N , in which case this equality is a direct consequence
of equation (2). To see why this is true for any 1 ≤ i ≤ N ,
simply note that the ordering of users is arbitrary so any user
making a change may be viewed as the N th user.
Consider now a sequence of strategy changes made by
users asynchronously, in which each change improves the
corresponding user’s payoff (this is referred to as a sequence
of improvement steps). The result in the previous paragraph
shows that the potential function also improves in every such
change sequence. Since the potential function of any strategy
profile is finite, we have the following result [2]:
Proposition 1 (finite improvement property (FIP)):
For every congestion game, every sequence of asynchronous
improvement steps is finite and converges to a pure strategy
Nash Equilibrium (NE). Furthermore, this NE is a local
optimum of the potential function φ, defined as a strategy
profile where changing one coordinate cannot result in a
greater value of φ.
It is not difficult to see why the standard definition of a
congestion game does not capture spatial reuse of wireless
communication. In particular, if we consider channels as
resources, then the payoff gr(n) for using channel r when
there are n simultaneous users does not reflect reality: the
function gr(·) in general takes a user-specific argument since
different users experience different levels of interference even
when using the same resource. This user specificity is also
different from that studied in [19], where gr(·) is a user-
specific function gir(·) but it takes the same non-user specific
argument n. To analyze and understand the consequence of
this difference, we would need to extend and generalize the
definition of the standard congestion game.
For the rest of this paper, the term player or user specifically
refers to a pair of transmitter and receiver in a wireless
network. Interference in this context is between one user’s
transmitter and another user’s receiver. This is commonly done
in the literature, see for instance [8]. We will also assume that
each player has a fixed transmit power.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section we formally define our generalized
congestion game, the spatial congestion game (SCG).
Specifically, an N -player SCG is given by ΓN =
(I,R, (Σi)i∈I , {Ki}i∈I , {gir}r∈R,i∈I), where Ki is the inter-
ference set of user/player i (i.e., users interfering with user i),
while all other elements maintain the same meaning as in a
standard CG. The payoff user i receives for using resource r is
given by gir(n
i
r(σ)+1) where n
i
r(σ) = |{j : r ∈ σj , j ∈ Ki}|.
That is, user i’s payoff for using resource r is a (user-specific)
function of the number of users interfering with itself, plus
itself. Here we have explicitly made the payoff functions user-
specific, as evidenced by the index i in gir(·). This is done
in an attempt to capture the fact that users with different
coding/modulation schemes may obtain different rates from
using the same channel even when facing the same level of
interferences.
A user’s payoff is the sum of payoffs from all the resources
it uses. Note that if a user is allowed to simultaneously use
all available resources, then its best strategy is to simply use
all of them regardless of other users, provided that gir is a
non-negative function. If all users are allowed such a strategy,
then the existence of an NE is trivially true.
In this paper, we will limit our attention to the case where
each user is allowed only one channel at a time, i.e., its strategy
space Σi = R consists of R single channel strategies. In this
case, the payoff user i receives for using a single channel r is
given by gir(n
i
r + 1) where n
i
r(σ) = |{j : r = σj , j ∈ Ki}|.
It is easy to see that we can equivalently represent this prob-
lem on the following directed graph, where a node represents
a user and a directed edge connects node i to node j if and
only if i ∈ Kj . The spatial congestion game can now be stated
as a coloring problem 4, where each node picks a color and
receives a value depending on the conflict (number of same-
colored neighbors to a node); the goal is to see whether an
NE exists and whether a decentralized selfish scheme leads to
an NE. In this paper we will limit our attention to the case of
undirected graphs, where there is an undirected edge between
nodes i and j if and only if i ∈ Kj and j ∈ Ki. This has
the intuitive meaning that if node i interferes with node j, the
reverse is also true. This symmetry does not always hold in
reality, but is often a good approximation, and helps us obtain
meaningful insight. Another reason for this assumption is that
an NE does not always exist in a directed graph (as we show
in the Appendix via a counter example).
4We will use several colored graphs in our analysis, which may not show
as effectively in a black/white version.
4For simplicity of exposition, in subsequent sections we
will often present the problem in its coloring version, and
will use the terms resource, channel, color, and strategy
interchangeably. For the remainder of the paper, unless stated
otherwise we shall assume that every SCG we consider has
the following properties: (1) users only employ one resource
at a given time; (2) the payoff functions are user-specific and
non-increasing; and (3) the interference graph is undirected.
IV. EXISTENCE OF THE FINITE IMPROVEMENT PROPERTY
In this section we investigate whether the SCG possesses
the FIP property as in the traditional CG. If a game has
this property, it immediately follows that it has an NE as we
described in Section II. Below we show that in the following
three cases an SCG possesses the FIP property: (1) when there
are only two resources to choose from, (2) when all resources
are identical to a user, for all users, and (3) the graph is
complete.
A. The Finite Improvement Property for 2 Resources
We establish this result by contradiction. Suppose that we
have a sequence of asynchronous5 updates that starts and ends
in the exact same state (e.g., color assignment) for all users.
We denote such a sequence by
U = {u(1), u(2), · · ·u(T )}, (3)
where u(t) ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} denotes the user making the
change at time t, and T is the length of this sequence. The
starting state of the system is given by
S(1) = {s1(1), s2(1), · · · , sN (1)}, (4)
where si(1) ∈ {r, b}, i.e., the color of each user is either “r”
for Red, or “b” for Blue. A user i’s color si(t) is defined for
time t−, i.e., right before a color change is made by some user
at time t. Since there are only two colors, we use the notation
s¯ to denote the opposite color of a color s.
Since this sequence of updates form a loop, we can naturally
view them as being placed on a circle, starting at time 1−
and ending at T+, when the system returns to its original
state. This is shown in Figure 1. Note that traversing the circle
starting from any point results in an improvement path; hence
the notion of a starting point becomes inconsequential.
Since this sequence of updates is an improvement path,
each change must increase the payoff of the user making the
change6. For example, suppose user i changes from red to blue
at time t, and i has x red neighbors and y blue neighbors at
t.7 Then we must have:
gib(y + 1) > g
i
r(x+ 1) . (5)
5We will remove the word asynchronous in subsequent presentation with
the understanding that whenever we refer to updates they are assumed to be
asynchronous updates, i.e., there will not be two or more users changing their
strategies simultaneously at any time.
6Here we assume that a user only makes a change if there is strict increase
in its payoff.
7Since the users update their strategies in an asynchronous fashion, x and
y do not change between t− and t+.
(i)
S(1)
1
2
3
4
T
(i)
(i)(k)
(k)
(k)
(i)
(j)
(k)
Fig. 1. Representing an improvement loop on a circle: times of updates t
and the updating user (u(t)) are illustrated along with their color right before
a change. An arrow connects a single user’s two consecutive color changes.
We show that such improvement loop is not possible.
Similarly, we can obtain one inequality for each of the T
changes. We shall show that these T inequalities cannot be
consistent with each other. The challenge here is that this
contradiction has to hold for arbitrary non-increasing functions
{gir, gib}. The way we address this challenge is to show that
the above inequality leads to another inequality that does not
involve the payoff function when we consider pairs of reverse
changes by the same user. The following definition will be
useful for the proof.
Definition 1 (Reverse-change pairs): Consider an arbi-
trary user i’s two reverse color changes in an improvement
path, one from s to s¯ at time t and the other from s¯ to s at time
t′. Let SSit,t′ denote the set of i’s neighbors (not including i)
who have the same color as i at both times of change (i.e.,
at t− and t′−, respectively). Let OOit,t′ denote the set of i’s
neighbors (not including i) who have the opposite color as i
at both times of change. Similarly, we will denote by SOit,t′
(respectively OSit,t′ ) the number of i’s neighbors whose color
is the same as (opposite of, respectively) i’s at the first update
and the opposite of (same as, respectively) i’s at the second
update.
Lemma 1: (Reverse-change inequality) Consider a spa-
tial congestion game with two colors. Suppose an arbitrary
user i makes two reverse color changes in an improvement
path, one from s to s¯ at time t and the other from s¯ to s at
time t′. Then we have
|SSit,t′ | > |OOit,t′ |, ∀i ∈ I . (6)
That is, among i’s neighbors, there are strictly more users with
the same color as i at both times of change than those with
the opposite color as i at both times of change.
Proof: Since this is an improvement path, whenever i
makes a change it is for higher payoff. Thus we must have at
the time of its first change and its second change, respectively,
the following inequalities:
gis¯(|OSit,t′ |+ |OOit,t′ |+ 1) > gis(|SOit,t′ |+ |SSit,t′ |+ 1) ;
(7)
gis(|SOit,t′ |+ |OOit,t′ |+ 1) > gis¯(|OSit,t′ |+ |SSit,t′ |+ 1) .
(8)
We now prove the lemma by contradiction. Suppose that the
statement is not true and that we have |SSit,t′ | ≤ |OOit,t′ |.
5Then due to the non-increasing assumption on the payoff
functions we have
gis¯(|OSit,t′ |+ |SSit,t′ |+ 1) ≥ gis¯(|OSit,t′ |+ |OOit,t′ |+ 1)
> gis(|SOit,t′ |+ |SSit,t′ |+ 1)
≥ gis(|SOit,t′ |+ |OOit,t′ |+ 1)
where the second inequality is due to (7). This however
contradicts with (8) and thus completes the proof.
We point out that by Lemma 1 the payoff comparison
is reduced to counting different sets of users. This greatly
simplifies the process of proving the main theorem of this
section. Below we show that it is impossible to have a finite
sequence of asynchronous improvement steps ending in the
same color state as it started with. At the heart of the proof is
the repeated use of Lemma 1 to show that loops cannot form
in a sequence of asynchronous updates.
Theorem 1: Every spatial congestion game with only two
colors has the finite improvement property.
Proof: We prove this by contradiction. As illustrated by
Figure 1, we consider a sequence of improvement updates that
results in the same state.
Consider every two successive color changes, along this
circle clockwise starting from time t = 1, that a user u(t)
makes at time t and t′ from color s = su(t)(t) to s¯, and then
back to s, respectively. Note that this will include the two
“successive” changes formed by a user’s last change and its
first change (successive on this circle but not in terms of time).
We have illustrated this in Figure 1 by connecting a pair of
successive color changes using an arrow. It is easy to see that
there are altogether T such pairs (or arrows).
For each arrow in Figure 1, or equivalently each pair of
successive color changes by the same user, we consider the
two sets SSu(t)t,t′ and OOu(t)t,t′ in Definition 1. Due to the user
association, we will also refer to these sets as perceived by
user u(t). By Lemma 1, given an updating sequence with
the same starting and ending states, we have for each pair
of successive reverse changes by the same user, at time t and
time t′, respectively:
|SSu(t)t,t′ | > |OOu(t)t,t′ |, t = 1, 2, · · · , T . (9)
That is, the SS sets are strictly larger than the OO sets.
This gives us a total of T inequalities, one for each update
in the sequence and each containing two sets. Equivalently
there is one inequality per arrow illustrated in Figure 1. We
next consider how many users are in each of these 2T sets
(note that by keeping the same “>” relationship, the SS sets
are always on the LHS of these inequalities and the OO sets
are always on the RHS). To do this, we will examine users by
pairs – we will take a pair of users and see how many times
they appear in each other’s sets in these inequalities. We will
use the following lemma.
Lemma 2: Consider a pair of users A and B in an improve-
ment updating loop, and consider how they are perceived in
each other’s set. Then A and B collectively appear the same
number of times in the LHS sets (the SS sets) and in the RHS
sets (the OO sets).
The proof of Lemma 2 is given in Appendix A. Applying
to all users, Lemma 2 implies that these users collectively
contribute to an equal number of times to the LHS and RHS
of the set of inequalities given in Eqn. (9). Adding up all these
inequalities, this translates to the fact that the total size of the
sets on the LHS and those on the RHS must be equal. This
however contradicts the strict inequality, thus completing the
proof of Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 establishes that when there are only two re-
sources (colors), the FIP property holds, and consequently an
NE exists. It turns out that this result does not in general hold
when there are 3 or more resources/colors. A counter-example
is provided in the Appendix B to illustrate this point. This also
implies that with 3 or more resources/colors, an exact potential
function does not exist for this game, as the FIP is a direct
consequence of the existence of a potential function.
B. The Finite Improvement Property for Identical Resources
for Each User
The next theorem shows the second case in which the
FIP property holds, when all resources are identical to each
user, but different users can have different payoff functions.
This can represent the case where all channels have the same
bandwidth and same channel quality to each user (e.g, either
with frequency flat fading or with proper channel interleaving
such as IEEE 802.16d/e standard [20]), but users may have
different channel conditions.
Theorem 2: For a spatial congestion game,if for all r ∈ R,
i ∈ I, and n ∈ {1, . . . , N}, we have gir(n) = gi(n), then the
game has the finite improvement property.
Proof: We prove this theorem by using a potential func-
tion argument. Recall that user i’s total payoff under the
strategy profile σ is given by gi(σ) = g(ni(σ) + 1), with
ni(σ) = |{j : σj = σi, j ∈ Ki}|, where σi ∈ R, and we have
suppressed the subscript r since all resources are identical.
Now consider the following function defined on the strategy
profile space:
φ(σ) =
∑
i,j∈K
1(i ∈ Kj)1(σi = σj) = 1
2
∑
i∈K
ni(σ) , (10)
where the indicator function 1(A) = 1 if A is true and 0
otherwise. For a particular strategy profile σ, this function φ
is the sum of all pairs of users that are connected (neighbors
of each other) and have chosen the same resource under this
strategy profile. Viewed in a graph, this function is the total
number of edges connecting nodes with the same color.
We see that every time user i improves its payoff by
switching from strategy σi to σ
′
i and thus reducing n
i(σ−i, σi)
to ni(σ−i, σ
′
i) (as g
i is a non-increasing function), the value
of φ(·) strictly decreases accordingly 8. As this function is
bounded from below, the game has the FIP property, and this
process eventually converges to a fixed point which is a Nash
Equilibrium.
8It’s easy to see that a non-increasing function G(
∑
i,j∈K 1(i ∈
Kj)1(σi = σj)) is an ordinal potential function of this game, as its value
improves each time a user’s individual payoff is improved (which decreases
the value of its argument).
6C. The Finite Improvement Property for Complete Graphs
We end this section by stating that an SCG defined over a
fully connected graph always has the FIP property: SCG over
a complete graph simply reduces to the standard CG, thus the
result.
Theorem 3: When the graph is complete, the associated
SCG has the FIP property and thus a NE always exists.
V. EXISTENCE OF A PURE STRATEGY NASH EQUILIBRIUM
The FIP property guarantees the existence of NE, but such
property may not exist in general. In this section, we examine
what graph properties or user payoff functions will guarantee
the existence of a pure strategy NE in the absence of the FIP
property.
Specifically, we show that a pure NE always exists for SCGs
defined on graphs that are in the form of a tree or in the form
of a loop. We also show the existence of a pure NE when
the graph is regular, bipartite, and payoff functions are non-
user specific. We also give counter examples in Appendices C
and D that a pure strategy NE does not generally exist when
the payoff functions are non-monotonic or when the network
graph is directed.
A. Existence of NE on a Tree Graph
We show that a pure strategy NE exists when the underlying
network graph is given by a tree. We denote by GN the
underlying network (graph) of the N -player SCG ΓN . The
payoff functions gir(n
i
r) are non-increasing, and n
i
r(σ) denotes
the number of neighbors of user/player i (excluding i) using
strategy r.
Lemma 3: If every N -player SCG ΓN has at least one pure
strategy NE, then every (N+1)-player SCG ΓN+1 formed by
connecting a new player to an existing player in a N -player
network GN has at least one pure strategy NE.
Proof: By assumption ΓN has a pure strategy NE denoted
by σ = {σ1, σ2, · · · , σN}. Suppose ΓN is in such an NE. Now
connect new player N+1 to an arbitrary player j in GN . This
is illustrated in Figure 2.
N
N
GN+1
N+1
j+1
2
j−1
j
1
G
Fig. 2. Adding one more player to the network GN with a single link.
Let player N + 1 select its best response strategy:
σN+1 = ro = argmaxr∈Rg
N+1
r
(
nN+1r (σ) + 1
)
,
where nN+1r is defined on the extended network GN+1, and
takes on the value of 1 or 0 depending on whether player
j selects strategy r or not. We now consider three cases
depending on j’s strategy change in response to the network
expansion from GN to GN+1.
Case 1: σj 6= ro. In this case, player N + 1 selected a
resource different from j’s, so j has no incentive to change its
strategy in response to the addition of player N + 1. In turn
player N + 1 will remain in ro as this is its best response,
and no other players are affected by this single-link network
extension. Thus the strategy profile (σ1, · · · , σN , ro) is a pure
strategy NE for the game ΓN+1.
Case 2: σj = σN+1 = ro, and player j’s best response to
the network expansion remains σj = ro. That is, even with
the additional interfering neighbor N + 1, the best choice for
j remains ro. In this case again we reach a pure strategy NE
for the game ΓN+1 with the same argument as in Case 1.
Case 3: σj = σN+1 = ro, and player j’s best response to
this network expansion is to move away from strategy ro. In
this case more players may in turn change strategies. Suppose
we hold player (N + 1)’s strategy fixed at ro. Consider now a
new N -player SCG Γ¯N , defined on the original network GN ,
but with the following modified payoff functions for r ∈ R
and i ∈ I:
g¯ir(n
i
r + 1) =
{
gir(n
i
r + 2) if i = j, r = ro
gir(n
i
r + 1) otherwise
.
In words, the game Γ¯N is almost the same as the original
game ΓN , the only difference being that the addition of player
(N + 1) and its strategy ro is built into player j’s modified
payoff function. By assumption of Lemma 3, this game with
N players has a pure strategy NE and we denote that by σ¯.
Suppose σ¯ is reached in the network GN with player (N +1)
fixed at σN+1 = ro. If we have σ¯j = ro, then obviously player
(N + 1) has no incentive to change its strategy because as far
as it is concerned its environment has not changed. In turn no
player in GN will change its strategy because they are already
in an NE with player (N + 1) held at ro. If σ¯j 6= ro, then
player (N + 1) has even less incentive to change its strategy
because j moved away from ro which does not decrease player
N+1’s payoff on this resource, and at the same time its payoff
for using any other resource is no better. Again ro is player
(N+1)’s best response. In either case, strategy profile (σ¯, ro)
is a new NE for the game ΓN+1.
Remark 1: Note that in the above lemma, the network GN
itself does not have to be a tree. The lemma states that as long
as an NE exists for one class of networks, then by adding one
more node through a single link, an NE exists in the new
network.
Theorem 4: Any SCG defined over a tree has at least one
pure strategy NE.
Proof: The proof is easily obtained by noting that any
tree can be constructed by starting from a single node and
adding one node (connected through a single link) at a time.
Formally, we prove this by induction. Start with a single player
indexed by 1. This game has a pure strategy NE, in which the
player selects σ1 = argmaxr∈Rg
1
r(1) for any payoff functions.
Assume that any N -player game ΓN over a tree GN with any
7set of non-increasing payoff functions has at least one pure
strategy NE. Any tree GN+1 may be constructed by adding
one more leaf node to some other tree GN by connecting it
to only one of the players in GN . Lemma 3 guarantees that
such a formation will result in a game with at least one pure
strategy NE.
B. Existence of NE on a Loop
Theorem 5: Any SCG defined over a loop network has at
least one pure strategy NE.
Proof (Sketch): The detailed and complete proof of this
theorem can be found in Appendix E. We begin this proof by
assuming that every player on the loop always has a unique
best response. This will always be the case, unless equalities
of the form gir(x) = g
i
r′(x
′) cause two resources to be tied
as i’s best response. Even in the tie case, we can still get
a unique best response by assuming that each user has a
preference order among colors when the payoffs are the same.9
In fact, our assumption does not affect the validity of the proof,
because relaxing it only widens the set of NE a given game
on the loop has.
Under our assumption, we show that every player i can be
associated with a triple (a(i), b(i), c(i)) ∈ R3 of possible best
responses to different scenarios. The triple has the following
properties.
1) If i has no neighbors playing a(i), then i’s best response
is a(i), where a(i) = argmaxi∈R(g
i
r(1)).
2) If i has one neighbor playing a(i), with the other
neighbor not playing b(i), then i’s best response is to
play b(i).
3) If i has one neighbor playing a(i) and one neighbor
playing b(i), then i’s best response is c(i).
The main idea of the proof is to show the existence of NE
given the existence of players with various kinds of triples.
We start by showing that if there exists a player i∗ such that
a(i∗) = b(i∗), then an NE exists. The way to show this is
to hold i∗ fixed playing a(i∗) and let the other players alter
their strategies freely. Since the other players are essentially
playing on a line graph (which is a type of tree graph) we use
theorem 4 to construct a strategy configuration within which
each player in I − {i} employs their best response. We then
show that allowing i∗ to employ its best response under this
configuration constitutes an NE.
Next we show that if no such player i∗ exists (so that
a(i) 6= b(i),∀i), an NE must also exist. This is done by con-
structing an algorithm which produces strategy configurations
that satisfy many of the players around the loop. The algorithm
begins by assigning player 1 a strategy σ1 ∈ {a(1), b(1)}.
After this, the algorithm continues to allocate strategies σi
to i ∈ {2, 3, ..., N} in such a way that σi = a(i) unless
a(i) = σi−1 in which case σi = b(i). We use this algorithm
repeatedly to demonstrate the existence of NE under several
cases. The entire set of cases we consider exhausts all the
possible games where a(i) 6= b(i),∀i.
9For example, a user with a color preference of “red>blue>green” will
pick red if the payoffs of choosing red or blue are the same.
C. Existence of NE on a Regular Bipartite Graph
A graph is regular when all its vertices have the same
number of connections. A graph is bipartite when its vertices
can be colored red and blue (only two colors) so that no edge
connects a pair of vertices with the same color. Many well
known graphs are regular and bipartite including hypercubes
and rectangular lattices.
Fig. 3. The cube graph is regular and bipartite.
Theorem 6: If the network is regular and bipartite and
payoff functions are non-user specific, then there always exists
a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof: As payoff functions are not user-specific, we will
suppress the superscript i in the function gir(·). Suppose the
graph is bipartite and each vertex has degree d (so d denotes
the number of connections each vertex has, e.g., d = 3 in
Fig. 3). Without loss of generality, we order the resources
such that the payoff functions satisfy g1(1) ≥ g2(1) ≥ ... ≥
gR(1). If gr(d + 1) ≥ gb(1), then resource r dominates and
we can trivially construct an NE by allowing each player to
use resource r.
Now consider the case where gr(d+ 1) < gb(1). Since our
graph is bipartite, we may color the vertices with “colors” r
and b in such a way that no edge connects a pair of vertices
with the same color. We can think of this coloring as a
resource allocation σ. Under this allocation each employer of
b will receive payoff gb(1) (because they have no neighbors
employing b) whereas they would get gr(d + 1) ≤ gb(1) if
they played r, which is no better. So each employer of b is
playing its best response under σ. In a similar way, the fact
that gr(1) ≥ gb(1) ≥ gr(d+ 1) implies that each employer of
r is playing its best response.
We end this section by noting that regardless of the type
of graphs, whenever there is a dominant resource r, i.e., its
payoff function is such that gir(Kd+1) ≥ gir′(1), where Kd =
max{|Ki|, i = 1, 2, · · · , N}, for all r′ ∈ R and all i ∈ I, then
a NE obviously exists where all users share the same dominant
resource.
VI. DISCUSSION
While the results derived in this paper present original
contributions to the body of knowledge on congestion games,
the spatial congestion game has its advantages and limitations
as a model in the context of wireless multi-cahnnel networks.
In this section we discuss in more details the relevance of the
results obtained here as well as possible directions of future
studies.
Two results obtained in this paper are of particular inter-
est, namely Theorem 1 and Theorem 2. Theorem 1 showed
8that when users are limited to only two channels, the fi-
nite improvement property holds over arbitrary graphs with
user-specific payoff functions. Theorem 2 showed that when
channels are of equal width and propagation characteristics
for each user (as is the case when a contiguous block of
bandwidth is evenly sliced into smaller channels), the finite
improvement property holds. This is true even if the channels
are of different quality to different users, e.g., due to the use
of different modulation schemes. This latter scenario is a very
realistic one, as this is the case with multiple channels in WiFi
(IEEE 802.11b), bluetooth, and so on. The finite improvement
property suggests that in such systems greedy user updates
will lead to an NE, which is the local minimizer of the explicit
potential function (Eqn (10) in this case). This means that we
not only have an easy way of obtaining an NE, but also have
a sense of the (local) efficiency of this NE.
To precisely assess the optimality of an NE, a commonly
adopted approach is to characterize what’s known as the
price of anarchy (PoA). The PoA characterizes the “distance”
between the NE and the social optimal solution of the system.
One of the early results along this line was [21]. The bounds
of PoA were proven in [22] and [23] for both linear and
polynomial cost functions. Recent work such as [24] gave the
exact PoA for a class of congestion games. It identified a suf-
ficient condition for an upper-bound and later showed that the
bound is achievable. Reference [25] computed the exact PoAs
for congestion games with player-specific payoff functions in
the context of cognitive radio spectrum sharing. None of the
existing PoA literature studied the spatial congestion game as
we proposed in this paper.
One limitation of our spatial congestion game model is
that it treats all interference relationships equally, i.e., the
underlying network graph is unweighted. In reality the channel
quality perceived by a user depends not only on whoelse
is using the same channel and can potentially interfere, but
also its distances to these interfering users. One way to
address this is to define the congestion game over a weighted
network graph, and define the user payoff as a function of
the weights on links connecting interfering users who use the
same channel. Analysis along this line will be very interesting
yet challenging.
Throughout our discussion, we have limited our attention to
the case where each user can access one resource/channel at a
time. In reality it’s also possible for a user to access multiple
channels at a time. As mentioned earlier, if all users can access
all channels simultaneously and the available transmission
power is decoupled across the channels, then the resulting
congestion game is not particularly interesting, as an obvious
NE is where all users use all the resources. A more interesting
case is when users are limited to the number of channels they
can access simultaneously. An additional feature may be that
different users have different sets of channels they are allowed
to access, i.e., user i’s strategy space σi ⊂ 2Ri , whereRi ⊂ R
is user i’s set of allowed channels. Finally, a user may need
to spread the communication resource such as transmission
power among multiple channels, thus transmitting over one or
multiple channels implies different payoff functions for each
channel. All these features will make the resulting game much
more complicated and are subjects of future study.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered an extension to the classical
congestion games by allowing resources to be reused among
non-interfering users. This is a more appropriate model to use
in the context of spectrum sharing in multi-channel wireless
networks, where spatial reuse is frequently exploited to in-
crease spectrum utilization due to decay of wireless signals
distance.
The resulting game, spatial congestion game, is a general-
ization to the original congestion game. We have shown that
the finite improvement property (FIP) holds when there are
only two resources or the resources are identical to each user
(but may be different between users). The FIP guarantees the
existence of a pure strategy NE. We also show that a pure
strategy NE exists without the FIP if the network can be
modeled by a tree graph, a regular bipartite graph, a loop,
or with a dominate resource.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 2
First note that A and B have to be in each other’s interfer-
ence set for them to appear in each other’s SS and OO sets.
Since we are only looking at two users and how they appear in
each other’s sets, without loss of generality we can limit our
attention to a subsequence of the original updating sequence
involving only A and B, given by
UAB = {u(t1), u(t2), · · · , u(tl)} (11)
where u(tj) ∈ {A,B}, tj ∈ {1, 2, · · · , T}, and l is the length
of this subsequence, i.e., the total number of updates between
A and B. As before, this subsequence can also be represented
clockwise along a circle.
It helps to consider an example of such a sequence, say,
ABAABBABAA, also shown in Figure 4. In what follows
we will refer to an “odd train” as the odd number of consecu-
tive changes of one user sandwiched between the other user’s
changes, e.g., the odd train ABA in the above subsequence.
To avoid ambiguity, we will further write this sequence as
A1B2A3A4B5B6A7B8A9A10.
A few things to note about such a sequence:
1) Since the starting and ending states are the same, each
user must appear an even number of times in the
sequence. Consequently there must be an even number
of odd trains along the circle for any user.
2) A user (say A) only appears in the other’s (say B’s) SS
or OO sets if it has an odd train between the other user’s
two successive appearances. This means that there is an
even number of relevant inequalities where A appears
in B’s inequalities (either on the LHS or the RHS), and
vice versa.
3) Consider the collection of all relevant inequalities dis-
cussed above, one for each odd train, in the order of
their appearance on the circle (all four such inequalities
are illustrated in Figure 4). Then A and B contribute
to each other’s inequalities on alternating sides along
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Fig. 4. Example of an updating sequence “A1B2A3A4B5B6A7B8A9A10”
illustrated on a circle. The color coding denotes the color of a user right
before the indicated change. Each arrow connecting two successive changes
by the same user induces an inequality perceived by this user. The labels “L”
and “R” on an arrow indicate to which side of this inequality (LHS and RHS
respectively) the other user contributes to. As can be seen the labels alternates
in each subsequent inequality.
this updating sequence/circle. That is, suppose the first
inequality is A’s and B goes into its LHS, then in
the next inequality (could be either A’s or B’s) the
contribution (either A to B’s inequality or B to A’s
inequality) is on the RHS. Take our running example,
for instance, the first inequality is due to the odd
train marked by the sequence A1B2A3, and the second
B6A7B8. Suppose A and B start with different colors,
then in the first inequality, B appears in the RHS; in the
second, A appears in the LHS.
We now explain why the third point above is true. The
reason is because for one user (B) to appear in the other’s
(A’s) LHS, they must start by having the same color and again
have the same color right before A’s second change (see, e.g.,
the subsequence A1B2A3 in the running example). Until the
next odd train (B6A7B8), both will make an even number
of changes including A’s second change (A3A4B5B6). The
next inequality belongs to the user who makes the last change
before the next odd train (B). As perceived by this user (B)
right before this change, the two must now have different
colors. This is because as just stated A will have made an
even number of changes from the last time they are of the
same color (by the end of A1B2), while B is exactly one
change away from an even number of changes (by the end
of A1B2A3A4B5). Therefore, the contribution from the other
user (A) to this inequality must be to the RHS.
To summarize, one can see that essentially the color rela-
tionship between A and B reverses upon each update, and
there is an odd number of updates between the starting points
of two consecutive odd trains (e.g., 5 updates between A1 and
B6, or 1 update between B6 and A7) so the color relationship
flips for each inequality in sequence.
The above argument establishes that as we go down the list
of inequalities and count the size of the sets on the LHS vs.
that on the RHS, we alternate between the two sides. Since
there are exactly even number of such inequalities, we have
established that A and B collectively appear the same number
of times in the LHS sets and in the RHS sets.
B. Counter-Example for 3 Resources
The example below shows that the FIP property does not
necessarily hold for when there are 3 resources/colors.
Example 1: Suppose we have three colors to assign, de-
noted by r (red), p (purple), and b (blue). Consider a network
topology shown in Figure 5, where we will primarily focus
on nodes A, B, C and D. In addition to node C, node A is
also connected to Ar, Ap and Ab nodes of colors red, green
and blue, respectively. Br, Bp, Bb, Cr, Cp, Cb, and Dr, Dp,
Db and similarly defined and illustrated in Figure 5. Note
that these sets may not be disjoint, e.g., a single node may
contribute to both Ar and Br, and so on.
Ab
D
C
A
B
Br
Bp
Bb
Dr Dp
Db
Cr
Cp
Cb
Ar
Ap
Fig. 5. A counter example of 3 colors.
Consider now the sequence of improvement updates shown
in Table 1 involving only nodes A, B, C, and D, i.e., within
this sequence none of the other nodes change color (note that
this is possible in an asynchronous improvement path), where
the notation s1 → s2 denotes a color change from s1 to s2.
At time 0, the initial color assignment is given.
time step A B C D
0 b p p b
1 b → r
2 p → r
3 b → r
4 p → r
5 r → p
6 r → b
7 r → b
8 r → b
9 p → b
10 b → p
11 b → p
TABLE I
3-COLOR COUNTER EXAMPLE.
We see that this sequence of color changes form a loop,
i.e., all nodes return to the same color they had when the loop
started. If we can show that such loop is feasible, then we have
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found an counter example. For this to be an improvement loop
such that each color change results in an improved payoff,
it suffices for the following sets of conditions to hold. Here
we assume all users have the same payoff function and have
suppressed the superscript i in gir(·), and the notation “>k”
denotes that the improvement occurs at time k.
gr(Ar + 1) >1 gb(Ab + 1) > gb(Ab + 2)
>9 gp(Ap + 1) >5 gr(Ar + 2) ;
gr(Br + 1) >2 gp(Bp + 2) >11 gb(Bb + 1)
>7 gr(Br + 2) ;
gb(Cb + 3) >8 gr(Cr + 1) > gr(Cr + 4)
>4 gp(Cp + 1) >10 gb(Cb + 4) ;
gr(Dr + 1) >3 gb(Db + 1) >6 gr(Dr + 2)
It is straightforward to verify the sufficiency of these condi-
tions by following a node’s sequence of changes.
To complete this counter example, it remains to show that
the above set of inequalities are feasible given appropriate
choices of Ax, Bx, Cx and Dx, x ∈ {r, p, b}. There are
many such choices; one example is Ax = 5, Bx = 3, Cx =
7, Dx = 1, for all x ∈ {r, p, b}. With such a choice, and
substituting them into the earlier set of inequalities and through
proper reordering, we obtain the following single chain of
inequalities:
gr(2) > gb(2) > gr(3) > gr(4) > gp(5) > gb(4)
> gr(5) > gr(6) > gb(6) > gb(7) > gp(6) > gr(7)
> gb(10) > gr(8) > gr(11) > gp(8) > gb(11)
It should be obvious that this chain of inequalities can be
easily satisfied by the right choices of non-increasing payoff
functions.
It is easy to see how if we have more than 3 colors, this
loop will still be an improving loop as long as the above
inequalities hold. This means that for 3 colors or more the
FIP property does not hold in general. Note that the updates
in this example are not always best response updates; they can
be better responses which still result in payoff improvements.
C. Counter Example of Non-monotonic Payoff Functions
Below we show that a pure strategy NE may not exist when
the network graph is undirected but the payoff function is non-
monotonic, even when they are non-user specific.
Example 2: Consider a 3-user, 2-resource network given
in Figure 6. The payoff functions have the following property
g2(2) > g1(2) > g2(1) > g1(3) > g1(1) > g2(3) .
One example of this is when g1(1) = 2, g1(2) = 5, g1(3) =
3, g2(1) = 4, g2(2) = 6, and g2(3) = 1. The game matrix
corresponding to these payoff functions are given below. It is
easy to verify that there exists no pure strategy NE.
User 3 /User 1,2 (1, 1) (1, 2) (2, 1) (2, 2)
1 5, 5, 3 5, 4, 5 4, 5, 5 4, 4, 2
2 2, 2, 4 2, 6, 6 6, 2, 6 6, 6, 1
3
1 2
Fig. 6. Counter example of non-monotonic payoff functions
D. Counter Example of a Directed Graph
Below we show that a pure strategy NE may not exist when
the network graph is directed.
Example 3: Consider a 4-user, 3-resource network given
in Figure 7. It can be shown that a pure strategy NE does not
exist when the payoff functions are non-increasing and have
the following property.
g3(1) > g2(1) > g2(2) > g3(2) > g1(1) > g1(2)
> g2(3) > g1(3) > g2(4) > g1(4) > g3(3) > g3(4) .
4
1
2 3
Fig. 7. Counter-example for directed graphs
We do not include an example game matrix for brevity. We
invite an interested reader to verify this example.
E. Proof of Theorem 5
Here we give a constructive proof that every SCG on a loop
graph has a NE.
Suppose our set of players I = {0, 1, ..., N−1} are labeled
from 0 to N − 1. The interference graph forms a loop so that
each i ∈ I has interference set Ki = {i − 1, i + 1}, where
addition is performed modulo N (throughout this proof).
Suppose we have resource set R = {1, 2, ..., R} and each
player i is associated with non-increasing payoff functions
gi1, g
i
2, ..., g
i
R overall resources 1 to R.
A strategy allocation σ = (σ0, σ1, ..., σN−1) is an assign-
ment of one resource (strategy) σi ∈ R to each i ∈ I. A
player i will select the strategy i that maximize its payoff
gir(1 + |{j ∈ Ki : σj = r}|). For a multi-set S of elements
from R, let us define βi(S) = argmaxr∈R gir (1 + |S ∩ {r}|)
to be the set of best responses that player i has when S is the
multi-set of strategies allocated to its neighbors.
In this proof, we are concerned with games on loop graphs
where each player has two neighbors. This means we are
concerned with the values of βi({a, b}) with a, b ∈ R.10
Recall that a strategy allocation σ is a Nash equilibrium (NE)
if and only if σi = βi({σi−1, σi+1}), ∀i ∈ I.
10Note that {a, a} 6= {a} because we are discussing multi-sets.
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Often βi(S) will be a singleton (a single well defined best
response). This will happen except when equalities of the form
gir(x) = g
i
r′(x
′) cause multiple strategies/resources to be tied
as best responses. In this proof we shall assume that such
equalities do not occur so we can think of βi as a map from
R2 to R. We will show the existence of Nash equilibria under
this restriction. Relaxing the restriction will only increase the
number of options players have as their best responses and
will hence maintain previously found Nash equilibria.
Now we shall examine the possible types of players (i.e.,
the different forms that best response function βi can take for
different players).
For i ∈ I let (a(i), b(i), c(i)) denote the type of player i
where:
1) a(i) = βi(∅) = argmaxr∈R(gir(1)),
2) b(i) = βi({a(i)})
3) c(i) = βi({a(i), b(i)}).
The way that a type (a(i), b(i), c(i)) player’s best responses
depend upon their surroundings can be summarized as follows:
1) If i has no neighbors employing a(i) (as in a(i) /∈
{σi−1, σi+1}), then i’s best response is a(i).
2) If i has one neighbor playing a(i) whilst its other
neighbor is not playing b(i), then i’s best response is
b(i).
3) If i has one neighbor playing a(i) whilst its other
neighbor plays b(i), then i’s best response is c(i).
Player i’s best response will always be a(i), b(i) or c(i).
Note that these values may be equal to one another. Our
method of proof is to show how to construct NE given the
existence of players with various types.
Lemma 4: If there exists a player i∗ such that a(i∗) =
b(i∗), then there exists an NE.
Proof: Hold player i∗ fixed playing strategy a(i∗) and
allow the other players to evolve. In this scenario the remaining
players I − {i∗} are connected up in a line. The way these
players evolve is described by a game with modified payoff
functions f ir. These functions are defined so that ∀i ∈ I−{i∗},
∀r ∈ R, and ∀x, we have f ir(x) = gir(x), unless r = a(i∗) and
i ∈ {i∗−1, i∗+1}, in which case f ir(x) = gir(x+1). Consider
this modified game evolving upon the line graph induced upon
the players I −{i∗}. Since the line is a tree graph, we can be
assured (by theorem 4) that this system has an NE σ−i∗ .
Now let us reconsider player i∗ in the original system on
the loop with payoff functions gir. Suppose we set σi∗ = a(i
∗)
and allow the other players in I − {i∗} to keep the strategies
allocated to them under σ−i∗ . Each player in I−{i∗} will still
be employing their best response in this configuration (because
the modified system within which they reached this setup was
essentially the same as the original setup with i∗’s strategy
held fixed).
• If i∗ is such that a(i∗) = b(i∗) = c(i∗), then a(i∗) is
always i∗’s best response and i∗ will also be satisfied
under the configuration σ (which hence must be an NE).
• If σi∗−1 6= a(i∗) or σi∗+1 6= a(i∗), then again i∗ is
playing their best response and σ is an NE.
• If σi∗−1 = a(i∗) = σi∗+1 6= b(i∗), then i∗’s best response
will be to change to employ b(i∗). When i∗ switches its
strategy in this way it will not decrease they payoff of
its neighbors i∗− 1 and i∗+ 1 (which are not employing
b(i∗)), nor will i∗’s change increase the incentive for i∗−
1 or i∗+1 to change to use a different strategy. It follows
that once i∗ has switched its strategy to b(i∗) the system
will be in NE.
To deal with the remaining cases, we will use the algorithm
defined below. It takes in a value α ∈ {0, 1} and returns a
strategy allocation σ to the players.
Algorithm 1:
If α = 0 then σ0 := a(0), otherwise σ0 := b(0).
For i from 1 to N − 1 do
If a(i) = σi−1 then σi := b(i), otherwise σi := a(i).
end do.
Return(σ)
End
Let A(α) = σ denote the strategy allocation produced by
Algorithm 1.
Lemma 5: Suppose a(i) 6= b(i),∀i ∈ I, in this case the
strategy allocation A(α) = σ produced by Algorithm 1 has
the following properties;
1) ∀i ∈ {0, 1, .., N − 2}, we have σi 6= σi+1.
2) σi−1 6= σi 6= σi+1 implies that i is employing its best
response under σ, except in the case where α = 1 and
i = 0.
3) ∀i ∈ {1, 2, .., N − 2}, player i is employing its best
response.
4) If α = 0 and σN−1 6= σ0, then the system is in NE.
5) If we change the strategy of player i ∈ {2, 3, ..., N −1}
to some r 6= σi−1, then player i−1 will still be playing
its best response in the resulting configuration.
Proof: (1) follows from our assumption that a(i) 6=
b(i),∀i.
To see (2), note that if σi = a(i), then i is employing the
best response to its surroundings because it has no neighbors
employing the same strategy. If σi = b(i), then i > 0
(by our assumption) and the nature of Algorithm 1 implies
σi−1 = a(i). This means i’s best response is not a(i). Also,
supposing c(i) 6= b(i), we can see that i’s best response is
not c(i). This is because if it were, this would imply that i
has a neighbor employing b(i), which is nonsensical because
i itself is employing b(i) and we are assuming i’s strategy
is different its neighbors strategies. Now we have shown that
i’s best response is neither a(i) nor c(i) (when c(i) 6= b(i)),
it follows that i’s best response is b(i), which is what it is
playing.
(3) Follows directly from (1) and (2).
(4) Follows directly from (1) and (2).
To see (5), suppose i ∈ {2, 3, ..., N − 1} switches to r 6=
σi−1. By (3), we know i− 1 was employing its best response
before this switch. If σi−1 = a(i− 1), then this strategy will
clearly remain i− 1’s best response.
If σi−1 = b(i−1), then σi−2 = a(i−1). This implies i−1’s
best response is not a(i − 1). Also, supposing c(i − 1) 6=
b(i − 1), we can see that i’s best response is not c(i − 1).
This is because if it were, this would imply that i − 1 has a
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neighbor employing b(i−1), which is nonsensical because we
know that i − 1’s neighbors are playing a(i − 1) 6= b(i − 1)
and r 6= b(i− 1) respectively. So we have shown that i− 1’s
best response, in this case, must be b(i− 1).
Lemma 6: Suppose a(i) 6= b(i),∀i ∈ I. If there exists an
i∗ such that a(i∗) 6= b(i∗) 6= c(i∗) 6= a(i∗), then there exists
an NE.
Proof: Suppose such an i∗ exists, and without loss of
generality suppose i∗ = N−1 (we can do this by relabeling the
players without effecting the essential dynamics). Consider the
configuration A(0) = σ produced by Algorithm 1. If σN−1 6=
σ0, then the system is an NE by part (4) of lemma 5. Next
suppose σN−1 = σ0.
• If {σN−2, σ0} = {a(N − 1), b(N − 1)}, then change
N −1’s strategy to it’s best response, which is c(N −1).
This will not cause N − 2 to change their strategy by
part (5) of lemma 5. Also this will not cause 0 to change
its strategy, because it is employing a(0) and still has no
neighbors using this strategy. The system is hence in NE.
• If, on the other hand, {σN−2, σ0} 6= {a(N−1), b(N−1)}
then we must deal with two possibilities.
– If σN−1 = a(N − 1), then N − 1 will change to its
best response which is b(N−1). This will necessarily
be different to σN−2 because of our assumption that
{σN−2, σ0} 6= {a(N − 1), b(N − 1)} together with
the fact that σ0 = σN−1 = a(N−1). After N−1 has
changed its strategy to b(N − 1) its neighbors will
be satisfied. In particular, 0 will be satisfied because
now it has no neighbors employing its strategy, a(0).
Also, N − 2 will remain satisfied, by part (5) of
lemma 5. It follows that, once N − 1 has changed
its strategy to b(N − 1), the system will be in NE.
– The other possibility we must deal with is that
σN−1 = b(N − 1). This actually cannot occur,
because it implies σ0 = b(N − 1) and σN−2 =
a(N − 1), which contradicts {σN−2, σ0} 6= {a(N −
1), b(N − 1)}.
Let Q(i) denote the set (not multi-set) {a(i), b(i), c(i)} of
i’s best responses in different scenarios.
Lemma 7: Suppose that ∀i ∈ I we have that a(i) 6= b(i)
and c(i) ∈ {a(i), b(i)}. In this case there must exists an NE.
Proof: For any game satisfying the restrictions here, one
of the following is true
1) ∃i ∈ I, j ∈ {i− 1, i+ 1} such that a(i) /∈ Q(j),
2) ∃i ∈ I, j ∈ {i− 1, i+ 1} such that b(i) /∈ Q(j),
3) The game is equivalent to a game with |R| = 2
resources.
We show this by contradiction. Suppose that (1) and (2) are
both false, then since Q(i) = {a(i), b(i)} and a(i) 6= b(i) ∀i,
we will have that Q(i) = Q(i + 1), ∀i. This implies that the
game can be emulated by a game with R = Q(0) (because
no player ever has a best response outside of Q(0)). Since
|Q(0)| = 2 we have shown (3). Moreover, (3) implies that we
can use Theorem 1 to prove the existence of an NE in the
system.
From now on assume that (3) is false. This means that (1)
or (2) must hold.
Assume that (1) holds. We suppose, without loss of gen-
erality, that a(0) /∈ Q(N − 1) (we can do this by relabeling
the players without effecting the essential dynamics of the
system). In this case, the configuration A(0) = σ will be a
NE by part (4) of lemma 5.
Assume (1) does not hold. This implies that (2) is true,
so we shall suppose (once again without loss of generality)
that b(0) /∈ Q(N − 1). Consider the configuration A(1) =
σ generated by Algorithm 1. Under this configuration, each
player in {1, 2, .., N − 1} will be playing their best response
according to part (3) of lemma 5. Player N − 1 will also be
playing its best response by part (2) of lemma 5.
We now show that player 0 is also employing its best
response. If c(0) 6= b(0), then c(0) is not player 0’s best
response. The reason for this is that σN−1 6= b(0) and
σ1 6= b(0) (recall that any i must have a neighbor employing
b(i) in order for c(i) 6= b(i) to be their best response).
Next we show that a(0) is not player 0’s best response. First,
since (1) is false it must be that a(0) ∈ Q(1) = {a(1), b(1)}.
If a(0) = a(1) then σ1 = a(1) and we are done (because 0
has a neighbor playing a(0) ).
Now suppose, alternatively, that a(0) = b(1). In this case,
the fact that (1) is false implies a(1) ∈ Q(0) = {a(0), b(0)}.
Since a(0) = b(1) and b(1) 6= a(1), this means a(1) = b(0).
In other words, Algorithm 1 cannot assign σ1 := a(1) and
so σ1 = b(1) (which is equal to a(0)). Now, since 0 has a
neighbor playing a(0), this (once again) cannot be 0’s best
response.
Hence we have shown that 0’s best response cannot be a(0)
and cannot be c(0) (when c(0) 6= b(0)) and so 0 is playing its
best response, b(0), and the system is in NE.
With these lemmas in place, we can prove the stated result
as follows. If ∃i∗ ∈ I such that a(i∗) = b(i∗), then lemma 4
implies the existence of an NE. Now suppose that a(i) 6= b(i)
∀i ∈ I. If ∃i∗ ∈ I such that c(i∗) /∈ {a(i∗), b(i∗)}, then
lemma 6 implies the existence of an NE. Now suppose that
c(i) ∈ {a(i), b(i)} ∀i ∈ I. Now lemma 7 implies the existence
of an NE.
REFERENCES
[1] R. Rosenthal, “A class of games possessing pure-strategy nash equilib-
ria,” International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 2, pp. 65–67, 1973.
[2] B. Vo¨cking and R. Aachen, “Congestion games: Optimization in
competition,” in 2nd Algorithms and Complexity in Durham Workshop,
H. Broersma, S. Dantchev, M. Johnson, and S. Szeider, Eds., London,
UK, 2006, Kings College Publications.
[3] A. Fabrikant, C. Papadimitriou, and K. Talwar, “The complexity of
pure nash equilibria,” in 36th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of
Computing (STOC), 2004, pp. 604–612.
[4] M. Liu and Y. Wu, “Spectrum sharing as congestion games,” in An-
nual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing
(Allerton), Allerton, IL, September 2008.
[5] P. Gupta and P. R. Kumar, “The Capacity of Wireless Networks,” in
IEEE Trans. Info. Theory, Vol.46, No. 2, pp. 388-404, 2000.
[6] M. Liu, S. H. A. Ahmad, and Y. Wu, “Congestion games with resource
reuse and applications in spectrum sharing,” in International Conference
on Game Theory for Networks (GameNets), May 2009, Istanbul, Turkey.
[7] V. Bilo`, A. Fanelli, M. Flammini and L. Moscardelli, “Graphical
congestion games,” 4th Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
(WINE 08), LNCS 5385, pp. 7081, 2008.
13
[8] R. Etkin, A. Parekh, and D. Tse, “Spectrum sharing for unlicensed
bands,” IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, vol. 25,
no. 3, April 2007.
[9] W. Yu, G. Ginis, and J. M. Cioffi, “Distributed multiuser power
control for digital subscriber lines,” IEEE Journal on Selected Areas
in Communications, vol. 20, no. 5, June 2002.
[10] J. Huang, R. A. Berry, and M. L. Honig, “Distributed interference
compensation for wireless networks,” IEEE Journal on Selected Areas
in Communications, vol. 24, no. 5, May 2006.
[11] S. Adlakha, R. Johari, and A. Goldsmith, “Competition in wireless sys-
tems via bayesian interference games,” http://arxiv.org/abs/0709.0516,
2007, submitted for publication.
[12] E. Altman, A. Kumar, and Y. Hayel. A potential game approach for
uplink resource allocation in a multichannel wireless access network.
In Proceedings of the Fourth International ICST Conference on Perfor-
mance Evaluation Methodologies and Tools, 2009.
[13] A. Argento, M. Cesana, and I. Malanchini. On access point association
in wireless mesh networks. In IEEE International Symposium on World
of Wireless Mobile and Multimedia Networks (WoWMoM), 2010.
[14] L. Chen. A Distributed Access Point Selection Algorithm Based on
No-Regret Learning for Wireless Access Networks. In IEEE Vehicular
Technology Conference,, 2010.
[15] O. Ercetin. Association games in IEEE 802.11 wireless local area
networks. IEEE Transactions onWireless Communications, 7(12):5136–
5143, 2008.
[16] D. Sanyal, S. Chakraborty, M. Chattopadhyay, and S. Chattopadhyay.
Congestion Games in Wireless Channels with Multipacket Reception
Capability. In Information and Communication Technologies, pages
201–205. Springer, 2010.
[17] H. Shiang and M. van der Schaar. Information-Constrained Resource
Allocation in Multicamera Wireless Surveillance Networks. IEEE
Transactions on Circuits and Systems for Video Technology, 20(4):505–
517, 2010.
[18] D. Monderer and L. S. Shapley, “Potential games,” Games and
Economic Behavior, vol. 14, no. 0044, pp. 124–143, 1996.
[19] I. Milchtaich, “Congestion games with player-specific payoff functions,”
Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 111–124, 1996.
[20] “IEEE 802.16e-2005 and IEEE Std 802.16-2004/Cor1-2005,” http://
www.ieee802.org/16/.
[21] E. Koutsoupias, C.H. Papadimitriou, “Worst-case equilibria,” Proceed-
ings of the 16th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer
Science, pp. 404–413, 1999.
[22] G. Christodoulou and E. Koutsoupias, “The price of anarchy of finite
congestion games,” The 37th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory and
Computing (STOC), 2005.
[23] S. Aland, D. Dumrauf, M. Gairing, B. Monien, and F. Schoppmann,
“Exact price of anarchy for polynomial congestion games,” Symposium
on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science, pp. 218–229, 2006.
[24] T. Roughgarden, “Intrinsic robustness of the price of anarchy,” STOC,
pp. 513–522, 2009.
[25] L. Law, J. Huang, M. Liu and S. Li, “Price of Anarchy of Cognitive
MAC Games“, IEEE Global Communications Conference, 2009
[26] Authors, “Spectrum Sharing as Network Congestion Games,” Technical
Report, 2010, Available online at http://ncel.ie.cuhk.edu.hk/sites/default/
files/SpectrumGameTechReport.pdf
[27] T. Roughgarden, “How unfair is optimal routing,” Proc. 13th Annual
ACM-SIAM Symp. on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), 2002.
[28] D. Chakrabarty, A. Mehta, V. Nagarajan, and V. Vazirani, “Fairness and
optimality in congestion games”, in EC, 2005.
[29] S. Sharma and D. Teneketzis, “An externalities-based decentralized op-
timal power allocation algorithm for wireless networks,” in IEEE/ACM
Transactions on Networking, 2008.
[30] A. Kakhbod and D. Teneketzis, “Power Allocation and Spectrum Shar-
ing in Cognitive Radio Networks with Strategic Users,” in the 49th IEEE
Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), December 2010.
